big time cat fancier

16.12.08

non-conceptualism


There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states.
--Robert Hanna

1 comment:

  1. conch pet you all
    conch petal ewe oil hover
    a grain
    kunstsprech uber alles

    inspectual analysis

    introspeck

    cochlea potential

    corn special!

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